The Return of Nuclear Weapons to the Global Platform : Daily Current Affairs

Date: 31/08/2022

Relevance: GS-2: Bilateral, Regional, and Global Groupings and Agreements involving India and/or affecting India’s interests.

Key Phrases: Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, India-US civil nuclear initiative, Review conference, Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, non-nuclear state, AUKUS, Indian Nuclear Program, global economic sanctions, Asia’s first nuclear power station.

Why in News?

  • An international conference to review the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty concluded at the United Nations in New York recently without a consensus document.
  • India, one of the world’s nuclear weapon powers, ought to be paying a lot more attention to the international nuclear discourse that is acquiring new dimensions and taking a fresh look at its own civilian and military nuclear programs.

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT):

  • The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament.
  • The Treaty represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States.
  • Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970.
  • On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely.
  • A total of 191 States have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States.
  • The Treaty defines nuclear weapon states (NWS) as those that had manufactured and detonated a nuclear explosive device before 1 January 1967. All the other states are therefore considered non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS).
  • The five nuclear weapon states are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
  • India is one of the only five countries that either did not sign the NPT or signed but withdrew, thus becoming part of a list that includes Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, and South Sudan.

Review conference:

  • The provisions of the Treaty envisage a review of the operation of the Treaty every five years, a provision which was reaffirmed by the States parties at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.
  • The 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons, ended without the adoption of a consensus substantive outcome.
  • The Tenth Review Conference, scheduled for 2020, was delayed because of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Indian Nuclear Program:

  • In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the US attempt to roll back India’s nuclear and missile programs generated serious concerns in Delhi.
  • India responded with a diplomatic strategy that sought to deflect external pressures.
  • After the nuclear tests in May 1998, India’s focus shifted to managing the consequences of that decision — including global economic sanctions.
  • The historic India-US civil nuclear initiative of July 2005 finally produced a framework that brought to an end Delhi’s extended conflict with the NPT system.
  • At the heart of the deal was the separation of India’s civil and military nuclear programs.
  • The consummation of the India-US nuclear deal a few years later gave Delhi the freedom to develop its nuclear arsenal and resume civilian nuclear cooperation with the rest of the world which was blocked since India’s first nuclear test in May 1974.

New challenges faced by the global nuclear order today:

  • Deepening divide between the main sponsors of the NPT back in 1970 – America and Russia:
    • Even at the height of the Cold War, there was always one major area of cooperation between the US and the Soviet Union — strong support for the NPT.
    • Most review conferences were jointly managed by close diplomatic coordination between Washington and Moscow.
    • More often than not, the nuclear problems of the Middle East involving Israel and Iran prevented successful outcomes at the quinquennial NPT review conferences.
    • The Ninth Review conference in 2015, for example, ended without an agreement because of major differences over establishing a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction.
    • Russia objected to critical references in the statement to Moscow’s military control over the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in the southeast of Ukraine.
    • The war in Ukraine has begun to envelop Zaporizhzhia, where the two armies are locked in combat and are raising the prospect of a horrible nuclear emergency.
  • Increasing nuclear armament:
    • The non-nuclear state parties usually complained about the lack of progress in implementing the disarmament provisions of the NPT.
    • The situation today is worsened by the absence of any dialogue between the nuclear powers on arms control.
    • Rather than reduce the salience of nuclear weapons, the major powers now put greater emphasis on their strategic utility.
  • Threats to non-nuclear weapon states:
    • The invasion of a non-nuclear weapon state, Ukraine, by a nuclear weapon power, Russia, has generated a whole series of new questions.
    • Russian President’s decision to put his nuclear forces on alert and threaten the use of nuclear weapons has sent a shiver down the spine of those who are on the periphery of nuclear weapon states.
    • Russia may have put its nuclear sword away, but the impact of Moscow flashing it early in the Ukraine war has been significant.
    • For those in Asia, who worry about China’s growing assertiveness, “Ukraine could well be the future of Asia”.
    • There are real fears that China might decide to flex its nuclear muscle while seizing the territory of its neighbours.
    • America’s Asian allies worry about the US’s ability to reinforce the “nuclear umbrella”.
    • East Asian policymakers are debating various options. These include building one’s atomic weapons, sharing the use of US nuclear assets, developing nuclear-powered submarines, building powerful long-range conventional counterstrike capabilities, and strengthening missile defenses.
  • Concerns over AUKUS:
    • Fourth, China’s political campaign against the AUKUS arrangement has found some resonance in South East Asia.
    • When the US and UK announced their plans to help Australia acquire nuclear-powered attack submarines in September 2021, China argued that the agreement violates the provisions of the NPT.
    • Although the NPT permits non-nuclear states to develop nuclear naval propulsion, Beijing persisted with the campaign.
    • Indonesia and Malaysia have raised concerns about the implications of the AUKUS deal for the NPT.
  • Role of nuclear power in clean energy:
    • Nuclear power is coming back into reckoning around the world amidst the growing challenge of climate change.
    • The draft final statement noted that “nuclear technologies can contribute to addressing climate change, mitigating and adapting to its consequences, and monitoring its impact”.
    • Separately, a group of 12 countries led by the US, UK, Japan, and South Korea emphasized the importance of nuclear power in meeting the Sustainable Development Goals set by the UN.

What kind of implications does the unfolding global nuclear discourse present for India?

  • India must find ways to end the current stasis in its civilian nuclear power generation, especially at a time when Delhi has outlined an ambitious program to reduce the share of fossil fuels in its energy consumption.
  • India, which commissioned Asia’s first nuclear power station more than 50 years ago, is stuck today with a total generating capacity of barely 7,000 MW.
  • India’s historic civil nuclear initiative was meant to open up international collaboration to boost the production of atomic electric power.
  • But the enormous political and diplomatic energy that went into ending India’s nuclear isolation was squandered by the disastrous 2010 Civil Nuclear Liability Act which has made it impossible for private players - internal and external — to contribute to the program.
  • Revisiting that law is now an urgent imperative for any Indian strategy to rapidly raise the contribution of nuclear power to India’s energy mix.

Conclusion:

  • India must also recognize and adapt to the return of nuclear weapons as major instruments of great power military strategy.
  • Delhi must ask itself if its nuclear weapons can deter China’s expanding atomic arsenal. After 1998, India premised its strategy on building “credible minimum deterrence”.
  • The time has come to reflect on the “credible” side of that strategy and redefine what the ‘minimum’ might be.

Source: Indian Express

Mains Question:

Q. What are the new challenges faced by the global nuclear order and what are their implications for India? Explain.